This paper examines how institutional conditions in transition economies compare with those in the rest of the world using various indicators of governance. The focus is on the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union but, when possible, transition countries Asian and Africa are also considered. The main findings are that transition economies, as a group, are no longer distinguishable from other economies, but at the same time, there are large differences in institutional performance within the group of transition economies. A formal cluster analysis is conducted in order map transition economies into homogeneous groupings of countries. The results of this analysis highlight that transition economies are found at all clusters (from best to worst institutional performers) and also that a group of five countries, all of which are EU accession countries appear to have "graduated": when taking into account their level of income, their institutional conditions are no longer distinguishable from those in the most advanced industrialized countries.
Introduction
The label "transition economies" is by now part of our regular vocabulary. Yet, the group of countries that share this label seem to have become increasingly diverse and their commonalties are increasingly historical. After all, the transition process is by now about a decade old. The countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union have been in transition for 8 to 9 years and Eastern European countries started transiting even earlier.
The Asian's transition is more difficult to date since there are some countries that have only started transforming their economies and others that arguably have been doing so for a much longer time than the last decade. At any rate, about 10 years after the breakup of the former Soviet Union it seems natural to ask whether the transition label is still warranted or whether for some countries the transition is over and, for the others, how far their reforms have come. There are already a number of recent papers that address this question, but they mainly focus on the macroeconomic dimension and try to settle some of the early debates (such as the impact of inflation and stabilization, the choice of exchange rate regime, big bang versus gradualist reforms etc.) 1 See e.g. Fischer and Sahay (2000) , Wyplosz (1999) , or Berg, Borensztein, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (1999) . The paper shows that (i) transition economies are very diverse in terms of their institutional conditions and (ii) that transition economies as a group are no longer distinguishable from other economies. Jet there are groups of countries that are very similar among themselves and dissimilar from the others. For instance, the EU accession countries as a group have clearly better institutional conditions than the countries of the FSU. In fact, one finding of the paper is that (according to some measures) institutional conditions in some EU accession countries are not significantly different from those of industrialized countries. A new mapping of ex-transition economies is provided by a clusters analysis in which I classify about 150 countries into homogenous groups taking into account six factor that reflect institutional conditions. We find transition economies in all clusters.
The quantitative assessment of institutional performance conducted in this paper is feasible only because a number of indicators of institutional quality have become available recently. For instance, a world wide private sector survey, carried out for the World Development Report (1997) , provided indicators of firms' perceptions about issues such as the predictability of rule making, property rights enforcement or reliability of the judiciary.
Firms that sell country risk assessments have been holding experts' survey on issues such as the quality of the bureaucracy, rule of law and corruption. Finally, researchers have aggregated indicators from different sources into summary indicators. This paper uses data from all these sources to compile a comprehensive picture of institutional conditions. At the outset, it is important to clarify the definition of "institutional conditions".
The underlying concept is that a market economy can only operate if there are certain rules of the game and, in particular, that property and contract rights have to be defined and there have to be mechanisms that will credibly enforce them. A well working institutional framework guarantees these rights by enforcing them against violation by third parties as well as by the state. For instance, corruption, discretionary action of bureaucrats, 2 As emphasized for instance by North (1981) unpredictable changes in rules and policies, unreliable judiciaries are all means by which the state can de facto expropriate private agents.
The indicators used in this paper addresses these issues, i.e. they map out the quality of the institutional and legal infrastructure for private sector development. Several indicators directly reflect the views of the private sector as they are based on surveys of entrepreneurs. Thus, what is being assessed is not the theoretical legal framework adopted by legislature but rather the actual conditions facing individuals. This is the main advantage of the subjective indicators used in this analysis, (i.e. indicators based on opinions either of country experts or of private sector participants): they tend to reflect the reality of institutional reform rather than the rules that exist on paper. In terms of country coverage, I use both regional and global data sets. The regional data sets cover only the transition economies of the FSU and Eastern Europe. The cross section data sets cover transition economies in Asia and Africa, which will also be included in the analysis.
However, the focus of the paper is on the "traditional" transition economies.
It is also important to note what this paper does not do: it is not qualifying the political system. Although there exist indicators that gauge the degree of democracy or autocracy, or the extent of political and civil rights, these are not the issues addressed here.
Political and civil right are mostly not associated with economic performance whereas institutional variables of the kind used here have been shown to be closely associated with investment and growth. Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995) Brunetti and Weder (1998) study of large samples of countries and find that institutional performance impacts on investment and growth. Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) and Havrylyshyn, and van Rooden (2000) investigate transition economies and find a positive impact of institutions on FDI and growth (respectively). The results of the latter paper are consistent with the view that at first stabilization and good policy stimulate recovery, but sustained growth requires adequate pari passu development of institutions, which becomes more important over time. 4 Another dimension that is not in the scope of this paper, but which could easily be addressed with a similar methodology are structural reforms, which include inter alia the degree of privatization, the degree to which the domestic financial system has been developed, the working of central banks etc.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the data and presents some comparisons within the group of transition economies. The second section compares transition economies to the rest of the world by running regressions in a large cross section.
The third section presents result from mapping transition economies within a worldwide comparison of institutional performance into clusters. The fourth section concludes.
Indicators or Institutional Performance and Differences within Transition Countries
The paper makes use of three data sets on institutional indicators two of which are themselves aggregations from several underlying data sets. The first data set is from The indicators are called "Voice and Accountability", "Political Instability and Violence", "Government Effectiveness", "Regulatory Burden", "Rule of Law" and "Graft". In most of the paper I use five of the six variables, leaving aside the most political variable, "Political Instability and Violence". Each indicator is based on a combination of component indicators and the aggregation is performed with an unobserved components model (which expresses the observed data as a linear function of the unobserved common Nevertheless, I use these indicators (in addition to others) because they are the most comprehensive governance indicators available. In the tables, all indicators from this source are labeled PP, which stands for poll of polls.
A second data set from Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1998) , is derived from a worldwide survey of private sector views in 73 countries conducted in preparation of the World Development Report 1997. This data covers a sample of 20 transition economies.
The scale is from 1 to 6, with higher ratings indicating better performance. The advantage of this survey data is that it provides detailed indicators for instance on issues such as judiciary enforcement or predictability of rules. In the tables, indicators from this source are labeled PSS, private sector survey.
A third source is Campos (2000), who aggregates indicators from various sources.
This source provides time series data and thus permits an assessment of institutional progress in transition economies. It was compiled only for transition economies of the FSU and CEE, and therefore it does not provide a benchmark. The scale is from 0 to 10 with higher ratings indicating better performance.
All indicators data sets are described in appendix table 2. (1999a, p. 9) are only five points below the average industrialized country (as noted above, the ratings range from -20 to +20) whereas the reform gap is massive in countries such as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan or de Laos.
Figure 2
gives an impression of the changes in institutional quality over time. It presents means of bureaucratic quality (as calculated by Campos) for four groups of countries: the CIS, the Baltic's, the EU accession countries (which also include the Baltic's) and CE3, this is Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The main implication from this figure is that there are large differences between the transition countries. Furthermore, these differences already existed already a decade ago in 1989 and have stayed fairly constant over the last 10 years.
Are Transition Economies Different from the Rest of the World? Results from Cross Country Estimates of Institutional Conditions
This section presents the results of cross-country estimates of institutional conditions. The aim is to test whether institutional conditions in transition economies are recognizably different from other countries with a similar per capita income. FollowingGros and Suhrke (2000) initially I adopt a dummy variable approach, that is I estimate equations of the following type:
where IQ stands for various measures of institutional quality that are available for a crosssection of countries, (PP and PSS measures) GDPpc is GDP per capita, TransDum are dummies for groups of transition economies and Othdum stands for other regional country groups. I control for the level of income per capita because richer countries have a higher quality of institutions for a variety of reasons, and I want to control for differences in the stage of development. The first regression in Table 6 Burden, Accountability and Government Effectiveness) mostly confirm this impression.
The only dimension in which TRANSFSU&CEE is recognizably different (and worse) from the rest of the world is graft. In the other dimensions the dummy is not significant after controlling for income per capita. Some interesting side results are that LATIN countries, as a group, have significantly less regulatory burden and are more accountability than predicted by their income, but have a significantly low rating in terms of rule of law. INDUstrialized countries have more accountability even than predicted by their high Table 2 summarizes the results of 14 regressions. The aim is to test whether there are groups within the "classical" transition economies that are distinguishable from the rest of the world. After all, the fact that TRANSFSU&CEE was not significant in the previous estimates could be related simply to large differences within this group that were documented in the previous section. In this table two dummies are considered, CIS and CEE (see Appendix table 1 for countries in each dummy). The picture is now quite different from the one in table 3: the CIS dummy is negative and significant in all but one regression. By contrast, the results on the CEE dummy are much more mixed: they are positive and significant in some cases, negative and significant in others and insignificantly different from zero in most cases. The CEE seem to have a higher overall institutional quality than countries with similar income levels and higher voice and accountability but seem to be less strong in terms of consultation and communication with the private sector and have more bureaucratic discretion than other countries in the same income class.
Corruption has been such a prominent topic in transition economies that it is worth restating the results. Table 1 suggested that corruption is one dimension in which transition economies of the FSU and CEE have a markedly worse performance than other countries. See e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1995) . For surveys of corruption and development see Bardhan (1997 ) or Tanzi (1994 . Wolf and Gürgen (2000) give some actual examples of corruption and poor governance in transition dummy is significant and positive. For instance, the first estimate shows that in EU accession countries overall institutional quality is higher than predicted by their level of 
excluding the transition economies for three income groups: (1) still distinguishable from the rest of the world. The procedure differs somewhat from the dummy approach adopted above in that the latter assumes that the transition countries are sufficiently similar to the rest of the world to have common parameters alpha and beta and that information from these countries therefore can be exploited to estimate these parameters more efficiently.
The result of this exercise (using PP is that predicted values and actual values of institutional quality in transition economies do not differ significantly (t-test for the equality of means between the two series yields p=0.02). This is true for the high and middle income countries, whereas the low income countries were excluded since institutional quality turned out not to be significantly related with income. However, as mentioned above, for the group of transition economies overall actual institutional quality is well predicted by income and the two means are not significantly different. Thus, this additional exercise corroborates the finding of the dummy approach,
namely that institutional quality in transition countries are no longer distinguishable from the rest of the world.
Mapping ex-Transition Economies into new Clusters
Given the results of the previous sections it seems clear that the old transition label is no longer adequate. This last section maps the ex-transition economies into new groups by forming clusters of relatively homogenous institutional performers. Table 4 presents the results of a of mapping countries into groups using cluster analysis, a technique that allows to identify homogeneous groups based on a large number of criteria. 9 The results presented here were computed using six individual PP indicators (standardized for the level of income per capita). 10 The algorithm used is K-Means cluster 8 This many be an interesting results in itself since income and institutional quality are mostly thought to go hand in hand. However it does not apply for the poorest countries and this is robust for most measures of institutional quality and both, in samples including and excluding transition countries.
9
Cluster analysis is frequently in biology and medicine but also in marketing, e.g. to identify consumer target groups based on a number socio-economic characteristics.
10
In the table countries are presented in alphabetical order (on top the transition economies ( in gray) and below all other countries) since there is no particular ranking within each cluster. In addition to the "standard" PP indicators here I also included an indicator of political instability. The results are for the analysis. This algorithm works by assigning a country to the cluster with the smallest distance between the country and the center of the cluster. It thereby constructs groups of countries according to similarities (distances) between the sample elements measured over the six dimensional space. Appendix table 3 The number of clusters was determined using an explorative hierarchical cluster analysis 12 In other world that classification fit is best (and this criterion is zero) when the number of clusters is equal to the number of countries.
The results emphasize that a group of ex-transition economies have "graduated" to Again, we find Tajikistan in the bottom cluster.
Finally, Table 5 shows the results of the same cluster analysis exercise using the raw PP indicators, that is not controlling for the level of development. So far, in the paper I have preferred to evaluate institutional performance by taking into account the relative level of development, since clearly institutional and economic development go hand in hand.
However, causality may be going in both directions and therefore, this last table gives an indication of how well former transition economies are doing in absolute terms. By this measure, none of the former transition economy falls in to the cluster of highest institutional quality. However, we still find former transition economies in the other four clusters.
Conclusions
This paper has used governance indicators from different sources to explore the state of institutional conditions in transition economies and has obtained results that are quite consistent across indicators and sources. They show that transition economies are very diverse in terms of their institutional conditions but that transition economies as a group are no longer distinguishable from other economies. It follows that, at least as far as the institutional framework is concerned, the label "transition economies" is no longer Notes: Predicted Institutional Performance is estimated by regressing the PP Average on a constant and GDP per capita for three income groups excluding the transition economies. Using the estimates of the alfa an beta coefficients thus obtained and the GDP per capita numbers of for the transition economies of the corresponding income groups, predicted values of institutional performance are obtained. The income groups are (1) countries with (1998) GDP per capita below 3000 USS$ (2) countries with (1998) GDP per capita between 3000 and 7000 USS$ and (3) countries with GDP per capita above 7000 USS$. In these three estimates GDP was significantly associated with PP Average only for the middle and high income groups. Therefore only these countries are shown in the graph. 
